

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL

PTQ1487

PAGE 01 ADDIS 05211 01 OF 02 010601Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	ACDE-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00
	SRPP-00	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-08	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	DTC-01	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/046W						

-----D57BCE 010602Z /38

O 010553Z JUL 95

FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

TO SECDEF WASHDC//USDP: ISA-ME-A// IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2769

INFO AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE

KUSLO NAIROBI KE//DR// IMMEDIATE

JOINT STAFF WASHDC//CCJ-5// IMMEDIATE

HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL IMMEDIATE

HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL IMMEDIATE

USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5/CCJ4-7// IMMEDIATE

CSAF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 005211

CONFIDENTIAL C-0450-95

E.O. 12356: DECL: ON COMPLETION OF REDEPLOYMENT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ADDIS 05211 01 OF 02 010601Z
TAGS: OAU, MARR, MASS, RW, ET

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN BN IN RWANDA ALERTED TO PULL-OUT.
ACTION REQUESTED.

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y TEXT--PARAS 3 AND 6
RETRANSMISSION ADDIS 005203

REF: USDAO ADDIS ABABA IIR 6 830 0144 95, DTG
260619Z JUN 95, SUBJ ET INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS RWANDA
AND UNAMIR REDUCTION.

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ETHIOPIAN BN IN RWANDA ALERTED TO
REDEPLOY BETWEEN 17-19 JULY. UNAMIR PROPOSAL FOR
TROOPS TO RETURN BY AIR EQUIPMENT BY ROAD AND SEA IS
NOT VIEWED FAVORABLY BY TGE. TGE HAS ASKED FOR U.S.
TO SUPPORT REQUEST TO U.N. FOR USAF HEAVY LIFT TO
RETURN EQUIPMENT AS WAS PROVIDED FOR DEPLOYMENT IN
AUG 94.

3. DATT WAS CONVOKED BY ET CHIEF OF STAFF,
((TSADKHAN)) GEBRE TENSAI, ON 30 JUN 95. TSADKHAN
TOLD DATT THAT THE ET BN COMMANDER IN RWANDA
((ALEMSHET)) HAD BEEN GIVEN A WARNING ORDER BY THE
UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER TO PREPARE TO REDEPLOY THE ET
BN TO ETHIOPIA BETWEEN 17 AND 19 JULY. TSADKHAN SAID
THAT AN "OUT-LOAD SURVEY" IN COOPERATION WITH UNAMIR
WAS TO BEGIN ON MONDAY, 3 JULY. THE UNIMIR PLAN
REPORTEDLY CALLS FOR THE MAIN ETHIOPIAN PERSONNEL
COMPONENT TO BE RETURNED USING ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ADDIS 05211 01 OF 02 010601Z
ETHIOPIAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT FOR WHICH THE U.N. WILL
PROVIDE REIMBURSEMENT. THE U.N. WANTS THE ETHIOPIANS
TO MOVE THEIR EQUIPMENT OVERLAND TO MOMBASSA, THENCE
BY SEA TO ASSAB, AND FINALLY OVERLAND BACK TO ADDIS
ABABA. ALTHOUGH ACCEPTING, AND RESIGNED TO, THE
DECISION TO WITHDRAW THEM, THE ETHIOPIANS ARE NOT AT
ALL HAPPY ABOUT THE LAND-SEA REDEPLOYMENT PLAN (SEE
PARA 6 BELOW).

4. TSADKHAN SAID THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

APPREHENSION WITHIN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AND AMONG THE NGOS ON THE DECISION TO PULL OUT THE ET BN. HE SAID THAT NGO REPS AND LOCAL LEADERS HAD INFORMED UNAMIR AND THE ET BN COMMANDER THAT IF THE ETHIOPIANS WERE WITHDRAWN "MANY PEOPLE WOULD LEAVE AND CHAOS WOULD RESULT". ACCORDING TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, THE UNAMIR COMMANDER TOLD THE ET COMMANDER THAT HE SHARED THE CONCERN AND "FELT THE ETHIOPIANS SHOULD STAY IN THEIR ASSIGNED ZONE IN BATTALION STRENGTH--BUT, THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN SPECIFIC ORDERS BY HIS SUPERIORS AND HAD NO LATITUDE IN THE MATTER".

5. TSADKHAN ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE ETHIOPIAN REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U.N. WHO INFORMED HIM THAT THERE WAS "AMBIVALENCE WITHIN THE U.N." OVER THIS DECISION. ACCORDING TO TSADKHAN THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONCERN, EVEN AMONG THOSE WHO WISH TO WITHDRAW THE ET BN, ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF THE WITHDRAWAL ON SECURITY IN THE ET ZONE. TSADKHAN ALSO SAID THAT THE ET U.N. REP HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY THE "GENERAL ADVISING THE U.N." WHO ASKED IF ET WOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 ADDIS 05211 01 OF 02 010601Z
RECONSIDER AND KEEP THE BN IN RWANDA. TSADKHAN SAID THAT IF ASKED, ET MIGHT KEEP THE BN DEPLOYED, IF--AND ONLY IF--ITS MISSION UNDER THE NEW MANDATE WAS CLEAR AND ONLY IF THE UNIT WERE EMPLOYED AS A BATTALION AND NOT SPLIT INTO COMPANY FORMATIONS WHICH WOULD BE VULNERABLE AND VERY DIFFICULT TO SUPPORT.

6. GETTING TO HIS PRINCIPAL POINT, TSADKHAN SAID THAT THE PLAN FOR REDEPLOYMENT OVERLAND AND BY SEA FOR THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT (WHICH HAD BEEN TRANSPORTED TO RWANDA BY USAF C-5 AND C-141 AIRCRAFT AT U.N. EXPENSE) WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. HE POINTED OUT THE LOGISTICS OF SUPPORTING SUCH A MOVE (1,200 MILES) WERE PROBABLY OUTSIDE ETHIOPIA'S CAPABILITY ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE AND HE WAS NOT SANGUINE ABOUT THE U.N.'S ABILITY TO FILL THE SHORTFALLS. HE QUESTIONED WHO WOULD COORDINATE THE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMORED VEHICLES TRUCKS, EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO OPERATE THEM WITH

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THE FOUR NATIONS (RW, UGANDA, KENYA, ERITREA)
INVOLVED. WITH CONSIDERABLE EMOTION, HE ASKED HOW HE
COULD BE SURE HIS TROOPS ACCOMPANYING THE EQUIPMENT
WOULD BE LOOKED AFTER--WOULD THEY BIVOUAC, LIVE IN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNPTQ1488

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1488

PAGE 01 ADDIS 05211 02 OF 02 010602Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	ACDE-00	AID-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00
	SRPP-00	EB-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-08	L-01
	ADS-00	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	DTC-01	PMB-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00
	/046W						

-----D57BD4 010602Z /38

O 010553Z JUL 95
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECDEF WASHDC//USDP: ISA-ME-A// IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2770
INFO AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE
KUSLO NAIROBI KE//DR// IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//CCJ-5// IMMEDIATE
HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL IMMEDIATE
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL IMMEDIATE
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5/CCJ4-7// IMMEDIATE
CSAF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 005211

CONFIDENTIAL C-0450-95

E.O. 12356: DECL: ON COMPLETION OF REDEPLOYMENT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ADDIS 05211 02 OF 02 010602Z
TAGS: OAU, MARR, MASS, RW, ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN BN IN RWANDA ALERTED TO PULL-OUT.
ACTION REQUESTED.

HOTELS (WHO WOULD PAY), ETC. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT THE ADDITIONAL WEAR AND TEAR OF SUCH A LAND-SEA VOYAGE MIGHT PROVE TO BE BEYOND THE MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY OF HIS FORCE. FINALLY, HE SAID THAT HE HAD REQUIREMENTS FOR THE BN AND ITS EQUIPMENT THAT HE WAS WILLING TO DEFER FOR THE GREATER GOOD BUT WAS NOT WILLING TO DEFER FOR THREE OR FOUR WEEKS TRAVEL TIME. TSADKHAH SAID THAT HE WAS DISTURBED THAT AIRLIFT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO GET TROOPS IN BECAUSE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO THE U.N. BUT NOT TO GET THEM OUT SINCE THAT WAS ONLY IMPORTANT TO ETHIOPIA.

7. TSADKHAH SUGGESTED THAT IF THE TROOPS AND RPT AND THEIR EQUIPMENT WERE AIRLIFTED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO STRUCTURE THE REDEPLOYMENT IN A FASHON THAT WOULD LEAVE AT LEAST A RESIDUAL FORCE CAPABLE OF REACTING TO A CRISIS AT KIGALI FOR "A COUPLE OF WEEKS". IF REQUIRED TO MOVE OVERLAND HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO. HE SAID THE TGE WOULD BE "PRESSURING THE U.N. TO ASK THE U.S." TO LIFT THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT. HE ASKED THE DATT TO INFORM THE USG AND TO INQUIRE IF THE U.S. WOULD ASSIST WITH THE LIFT (READ AT NO COST) IF THE U.N. WOULD OR COULD NOT ARRANGE IT.

8. DATT COMMENT: DATT BELIEVES THAT TSADKHAH'S POINTS ARE VALID AND IMPORTANT ONES. IT IS NOT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

LIKELY THAT THE EQUIPMENT IS STILL UP TO THE RIGORS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ADDIS 05211 02 OF 02 010602Z
OF SUCH OVERLAND MOVEMENT AND THE ETHIOPIAN
MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY IS MARGINAL. IT WOULD BE
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE (AND COULD STRENGTHEN EXISTING
NEGATIVE VIEWS IN ETHIOPIA AND IN ERITREA ON SUPPORT
FOR PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES) IF ETHIOPIAN TROOPS AND
VEHICLES ARRIVED AT ASSAB IN DISREPAIR AND NOT
SUITABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT WITHIN THE ETHIOPIAN ARMED
FORCES. GIVEN THE SHORTAGE OF TRUCKS AND APCS HERE
IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WEAR THEM OUT IN ETHIOPIA
RATHER THAN ON KENYAN AND UGANDAN ROADS. FINALLY
(AND NOT DISCUSSED WITH TGE OR MOND), IT MIGHT BE
CHEAPER, AND A FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE, TO ASK THE
ETHIOPIANS TO TURN OVER ALL HEAVY EQUIPMENT (LESS THE
APCS) TO UNAMIR OR RWANDA AND REPLACE THEM WITH NEW
U.S. 2 AND 1/2 OR 5 TON VEHICLES. THIS WOULD REDUCE
THE EXTENT OF HEAVY LIFT REQUIRED TO 16 BTR'S AND
SOME ODDS AND ENDS.

9. AMBASSADOR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: GIVEN
OUR EMPHASIS AND PRESSURE ON THE TGE TO DEPLOY TO
RWANDA IT IS ONLY FAIR AND PROPER THAT WE SUPPORT A
REDEPLOYMENT WHICH MINIMIZES THE COST TO THEM. AT A
MINIMUM, WE SHOULD INFORM THE U.N. (AND THE TGE REP
THERE) THAT WE WOULD RESPOND FAVORABLY TO A REQUEST
FOR HEAVY AIRLIFT SUPPORT. SHOULD THE U.N. REJECT
SUCH A REQUEST BY THE TGE THEN CONSIDERATION SHOULD
BE GIVEN TO PROVIDING SUCH SUPPORT BILATERALLY. AS A
LAST RESORT, I BELIEVE THE DATT'S SUGGESTION ON
REPLACEMENT OF WHEELED VEHICLES BEARS CONSIDERATION,
PROVIDED THE DELIVERY CAN BE DONE EXPEDITIOUSLY AND
IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE TGE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 ADDIS 05211 02 OF 02 010602Z

10. ACTION REQUESTED:

A. FOR STATE: INFORM THE U.N. (AND THE TGE REP THERE) THAT WE WOULD RESPOND FAVORABLY TO A REQUEST FOR HEAVY AIRLIFT SUPPORT.

B. FOR DOD: ADVISE ALCON OF IMPACT/FEASIBILITY OF PROVIDING REQUIRED SUPPORT FOR ET HEAVY AIRLIFT (DEPLOYMENT REQUIRED TALCE AT ADDIS ABABA AND CONSISTED OF 13 C-5A AND 6 C-141 SORTIES).

C. FOR BOTH: ADVISE OF FEASIBILITY OF BILATERAL SUPPORT WITH HEAVY LIFT, VEHICLE REPLACEMENT OR OTHER ALTERNATIVES.

11. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, VISITING IN ADDIS, HAS REVIEWED THIS MESSAGE.
HICKS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED